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pscornerstone   pscornerstone Aare Kornar !'s TIGblog
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Kenya’s democracy on trial


http://blogs. independent. co.uk/openhouse/ 2008/01/kenyas- nightmar. html

On Thursday December 27th 2007, shortly after polling stations were closed, Kenya was hailed as having fulfilled an African dream – to have a free and fair closely contested democratic election. But less than 48 hours later it was clear that the dream of democracy could become a nightmare of ethnic violence. Most of the casualties so far have been the poor and the marginalized – and if things continue as they are, a bitter civil war fought along ethnic lines is certain. To say that what is at stake is the very future of Kenya is not an overstatement.

To answer the question of how the promise became a nightmare one must begin with very nature of democracy and how it has been functioning in Africa.

The first element to consider is that in the absence of strong democratic institutions (the three pillars of legislature, executive and judiciary), democracies in Africa are relying more and more on the goodwill of politicians: in this case, a nation is only as democratic as its politicians.

Added to this, African democracy is in real terms an expression of ethnic tensions. Instead of rolling back tribalism (I use the derisive term deliberately) , African democracy serves it. One could say that all democracies have an element of this: in the West it generally goes under the euphemism of voter demographics. When Hilary Clinton is courting the white, black or Latino vote, she is in fact practicing what might, in other circumstances, be called tribal politics.

In the Kenyan presidential election, ethnic politics were a key factor in the close election results: the incumbent Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, received very few votes in the Luo areas, while his Luo opponent, Raila Odinga, received only a very small percentage of the Kikuyu vote. In this bitterly contested election where ethnicity was the deciding factor, victory from either side was bound to spill into violence.

As a direct result of the above, questions of what true justice means and about the growing divide between haves and have-nots become lost to ethnicity. Raila is a flamboyant millionaire while Kibaki is as elite as you can get in Kenya. Lost in the fires of ethnicity is the simple fact that Kibaki and Raila have much more in common with each other than with their supporters. In this sense those engaged in the violence are, to put it bluntly, proxies in a war between two elite leaders.

Another element to consider is the extent to which the landscape of African politics has changed. We need to stop blanket condemnations of African leadership, and acknowledge that it varies and some leaders are better or worse than others. Kibaki, while not a Mandela is not a Moi or a Mobutu, or a Bokassa or an Idi Amin. By the same token the nature of opposition has changed. Since independence and the struggles against neo-colonial governments, opposition has been automatically understood as the legitimate voice of the people. But opposition no longer means the good guys. In many instances the opposition and the sitting government are practically the same as is indeed the case in Kenya. So while Raila is accusing Kibaki of vote-rigging, it could just as easily be Raila trying to rig and short-circuit the democratic process to favor himself. In other words we have no reason to take either of their claims to be true at face-value. In this impasse of two leaders intent on seizing power, respect for the democratic process couldn’t be more important.

Raila in my opinion seems to be attempting to foment a Ukrainian-style Orange revolution hence the call for a million-man march in the capital and the threats to form a parallel government. In a country demarcated along ethnic lines, this will only lead to more ethnic violence. Luos will arm against the Kikuyus who will in turn form Kikuyu defense teams. The result will be not a fast transition of power, but rather escalating ethnic violence. Only an insistence on true democratic processes will see Kenya through this crisis. And we need to bind both Kibaki, who is equally responsible for the violence, and Raila to these processes.

Toward a solution, Kenyans should realize that something beautiful did happen during this election. Most of the big men of Kenyan politics were voted out of Parliament and hence out of office. Even the sons of former dictator Moi did not win seats in Parliament. There seemed to be a belief that voting was a way of talking back the Kenyan political elite, and that democracy could be made to work for the majority poor. This is the flame that we must not let die.

To nurture this flame, a recount of the votes in a transparent manner is necessary. This, no matter what one thinks of Raila or Kibaki, or whether one thinks the elections were fair or not, should be the meeting ground of all those concerned about the future, immediate and long term, of Kenya.

If the votes can be recounted in full transparency, this election will not then become the death of Kenyan democracy but rather a test along the way to a democracy with real content – the content of security, equality and justice for Kenya’s majority poor.

*Mukoma Wa Ngugi is co-editor of Pambazuka News and a political columnist for the BBC Focus on Africa Magazine.

January 10, 2008 | 8:55 PM Comments  0 comments

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pscornerstone   pscornerstone Aare Kornar !'s TIGblog
Aare Kornar !'s profile

Bakassiwatch

Dear Comrades,
>
> On behalf of Bakassiwatch, We wish you all End of
> Year Season and A
> happy New Year.
>
> We sincerely thank you all for following up on
> Bakassi issues and
> support our quest for Self Determination.
>
> Thanks
>
> Agustus E.
>
> This issue content the following
>
> 1.Copy of the Green Tree Aggreement
>
> 2. Senate Committee breif on Bakassi
>
> 3.$ 40 million Fund s for Bakassi Disappear.
> 4. Call for Support to stop the Senate Committee.
> ========================================
> Greentree Accord to Reinforce ICJ Verdict on BAKASSI
>
> Below is a full text of the agreement signed in New
> York on June 12,
> 2006.
> ________________________________________
>
> The Republic of Cameroon (hereinafter referred to as
> "Cameroon") and
> the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter
> referred to as
> "Nigeria").
>
> *Reaffirming their willingness to peacefully
> implement the judgment of
> the International Court of Justice,
>
> *Commending the secretary-general of the United
> Nations for his
> efforts made in this respect in organizing the
> tripartite summits and
> establishing the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission,
>
> *Considering that the question of the withdrawal
> from and transfer of
> authority over the Bakassi Peninsula should be
> treated in a forward-
> looking spirit of goodwill in order to open new
> prospects for
> cooperation between the two countries after decades
> of difficult
> bilateral relations,
>
> *Determined to encourage the consolidation of
> confidence and peace
> between their two countries for the well-being of
> their peoples and
> for stability in the subregion,
>
> Have decided to conclude the present agreement.
>
> Article 1
>
> Nigeria recognizes the sovereignty of Cameroon over
> the Bakassi
> Peninsula in accordance with the judgment of the
> International Court
> of Justice of 10 October 2002 in the matter of land
> and maritime
> boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. Cameroon and
> Nigeria recognize
> the land and maritime boundary between the two
> countries as delineated
> by the Court and commit themselves to continuing the
> process of
> implementation already begun.
>
> Article 2
>
> Nigeria agrees to withdraw all its armed forces from
> the Bakassi
> Peninsula within sixty days of the date of the
> signing of this
> Agreement. If exceptional circumstances so require,
> the secretary-
> general of the United Nations may extend the period,
> as necessary, for
> a further period not exceeding a total of thirty
> days. This withdrawal
> shall be conducted in accordance with the modalities
> envisaged in
> annex 1 to this agreement.
>
> Article 3
>
> 1. Cameroon, after the transfer of authority to it
> by Nigeria,
> guarantees to Nigerian nationals living in the
> Bakassi Peninsula the
> exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms
> enshrined in
> international human rights law and in other relevant
> provisions of
> international law.
>
> 2. In particular, Cameroon shall:
>
> (a) not force Nigerian nationals living in the
> Bakassi Peninsula to
> leave the Zone or to change their nationality;
> (b) respect their culture, language and beliefs;
> (c) respect their right to continue their
> agricultural and fishing
> activities;
> (d) protect their property and their customary land
> rights;
> (e) not levy in any discriminatory manner any taxes
> and other dues on
> Nigerian nationals living in the zone; and
> (f) take every necessary measure to protect Nigerian
> nationals living
> in the zone from any harassment or harm.
>
> Article 4
>
> Annex I and the map contained in Annex II to this
> agreement shall
> constitute an integral part thereof.
>
> No part of this agreement shall be interpreted as a
> renunciation by
> Cameroon of its sovereignty over any part of its
> territory.
>
> Article 5
>
> This agreement shall be implemented in good faith by
> the parties, with
> the good offices of the secretary-general of the
> United Nations, if
> necessary, and shall be witnessed by the United
> Nations, the Federal
> Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the United
> Kingdom of Great
> Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States
> of America.
>
> Article 6
>
> 1. A follow-up committee to monitor the
> implementation of this
> agreement is hereby established. It shall be
> composed of
> representatives of Cameroon, Nigeria, the United
> Nations and the
> witness States. The committees shall monitor the
> implementation of the
> agreement by the parties with the assistance of the
> United Nations
> observers of the Mixed Commission.
>
> 2. The follow-up committee shall settle any dispute
> regarding the
> interpretation and implementation of this agreement.
>
> 3. The activities of the follow-up committee shall
> cease at the end of
> the period of the special transitional regime
> provided for in
> paragraph 4 of annex I to this agreement.
>
> Article 7
>
> This agreement shall in no way be construed as an
> interpretation or
> modification of the judgment of the International
> Court of Justice of
> 10 October 2002, for which the agreement only sets
> out the modalities
> of implementation.
>
>
=== message truncated ===

January 7, 2008 | 5:27 AM Comments  0 comments

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